asemic net: EZE

Works of fulu look to have (or to have had) semantic content, but over time, the need for semantic content may have fallen out, leaving works of fulu asemic.

Per the Wikipedia, here is the narrative at play in this de-semantic process:

... scholars of Taoism such as James Robson and Gil Raz have claimed that the incomprehensibility of written forms is central to the talisman's perceived authority and efficacy, and is one of talismanic script's defining features.
During the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317–420), it was already considered unnecessary for users of Taoist talismans to be able to decipher the writing on them in order for them to be considered efficacious. Ge Hong noted in his Baopuzi that as long as the inscription was authentic, successful use of the talisman did not depend on whether the user was able to decipher its script. By this time, the talisman's illegibility had already become a sign that they were of divine authority and held supernatural provenance. (from Dominic Steavu)

An aside for Hegelians: ... , note the Hegelian dialectics at play here, with Aufhebung operative, but ... .

...

A Reflection:

Tortoise Shell Markings in the Dragon Bones Series

by Cece Chapman and Jeff Crouch (2020)

...

Related Topics

On Planchette Writing

On Fu Chi

...

On Spirits of the Dead by Edgar Allan Poe

On Automatic Writing

On Automatic Writing by Henry James

On Writing by Ezra Pound

...

On Asemic Writing

...

Saturday, August 16, 2025

On the Capacity to Retract / EZE, 2025

On the Capacity to Retract

Already After

Topologically

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Sunday, August 10, 2025

Saturday, August 9, 2025

Thought without Words / EZE, 2025

Linguistic Turn

History of the Linguistic Turn

Pragmatic Twist of the Linguistic Turn

Language of Thought

On the Language of Thought (Stanford)

About Jerry Fodor

Language !~ Thought

Language and Thought Are Not the Same (NIH)

On Interoperability

Interoperability

Note: This argument looks to be extensible--

that is, a means for making relationships beyond language itself.

On Cormac McCarthy

On the Bodily

Deep Ecology (Arguments for Signaling We Usually Ignore ... )

While Deep Ecology (earth.org) itself is often associated with radical theory and/or with radical politics, Deep Ecology, the Substack publication, generally concerns brilliant observations loosely coupled with conjectures concerning our inter-relatedness as/with beings in nature.

Indeed, the overarching theme for Deep Ecology (Wikipedia) is environmentalism or environmental philosophy.

Deep Ecology holds a general thesis that we are evolutionary beings, and as such, we may have abilities that beings in our evolutionary path also have. We have, in other words, shared capacity with nature. And we have, so the argument goes, not so much lost this capacity as suppressed/ignored/forgotten it. The imperative: We need to look to nature to find this capacity again. Hence, the brilliant observations.

How well this thesis works is one matter, but the purpose of citing Deep Ecology is not to criticize its argument so much as exploit a few aspects of it.

The argument Deep Ecology makes in this post (Feeling It) posits a conception of feeling as pre-linguistic. It also asserts how we are trained, so to speak, to ignore feelings that so arise, feelings that arise without the supplement of a near immediate interpretation, an interpretation which requires language.

More so, we are also wont to avoid unfounded conjecture. Indeed, as presented in this post (Feeling It), we might be inclined to link an ill feeling in the morning, a premonition, to a friend found injured in the afternoon, but we force ourselves to forgo this unwarranted reasoning.

And, of course, being so trained, we do not ask ourselves why such a feeling might have come to be at all. We ignore it as superstition/coincidence. Deep Ecology, meanwhile, conjectures that such feeling might be a hidden capacity.

For our purposes, we take this argument to imply that thought happens without language.

One Next Step

Neuropsychology (Wikipedia)