Friday, November 20, 2026

Intentionality ~ Evolution ~ Structural Asemics - AI / EZE, 2026

AI

The Architecture of the Ghost: Intentionality, Evolution, and the Rise of Structural Asemics
I. The History of Meaning as Intentionality
Throughout intellectual history, meaning has rarely been conceived as an autonomous property of objects; rather, it has been tethered to intentionality—the capacity of a mind to be about something, to direct itself toward an object, goal, or state of affairs.
In classical antiquity, Aristotle grounded meaning in telos (purpose), positing that everything in nature possessed an inherent, quasi-intentional drive toward its proper end.[^1] Medieval scholasticism absorbed this teleology into a theological framework, where the universe was a legible text authored by a divine mind; things meant something because God intended them to signify.
With the Enlightenment and the phenomenological turn—most notably through Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl—intentionality was secularized and relocated strictly within human consciousness. Brentano famously defined intentionality as the "mark of the mental," arguing that every mental act is directed toward an object.[^2] In the twentieth century, analytic philosophers of language like H.P. Grice cemented this bond by defining "non-natural meaning" entirely through speaker intention: an utterance means X only if the speaker intends to produce a belief in an audience by means of the audience recognizing that very intention.[^3] Across all these eras, a single axiom held firm: where there is no mind to intend, there can be no meaning.
II. Neurobiology, Aphasia, and the Clinical Roots of Asemia
Before asemia was adopted as an aesthetic or philosophical concept, it emerged in the nineteenth century as a clinical neurological diagnosis. The history of research into how the brain processes language reveals that the decoupling of form from meaning is not merely a theoretical abstraction, but a concrete neurobiological reality.
In the 1860s and 1870s, the foundational discoveries of Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke shattered the Cartesian view of language as an indivisible, rational faculty of the soul, localizing it instead within specific cortical networks. Broca demonstrated that lesions to the left inferior frontal gyrus produced expressive aphasia—patients retained comprehension and communicative intent, yet lost the motor syntax required to articulate it.[^4] Conversely, Wernicke identified lesions in the left posterior superior temporal gyrus that produced receptive aphasia: patients generated fluent, grammatically structured speech ("word salad") completely stripped of coherent semantic content.[^5]
Building on these localizationist breakthroughs, the German physician Adolf Kussmaul coined the term asemia (from the Greek a- "without" and sema "sign") in 1877 to describe a profound neurological deficit: the total inability to comprehend or produce any form of communicative signs, whether linguistic, gestural, or symbolic.[^6] Later researchers, such as Henry Head and Roman Jakobson, further mapped how brain trauma fractures the axis between signifier (the acoustic or visual form) and signified (the conceptual meaning).[^7] Clinical asemia proved that the human brain separates the perception of structural form from the assignment of semantic intent. Even when the semantic module is damaged, the brain's pattern-recognition machinery continues to register—or generate—the empty architecture of language.
III. The Evolutionary Inescapability of Intentionality
Why has human thought remained so stubbornly wedded to intentionality, even after neurobiology demonstrated its mechanical fragility? The answer lies in our evolutionary neurobiology. The human brain is not a disinterested truth-seeking engine; it is a survival organ forged under intense selective pressure.
In the ancestral environment, failing to detect an agent—mistaking a stalking predator for a rustling bush—carried a fatal cost. Conversely, falsely attributing agency to an inanimate object—mistaking a rustling bush for a predator—carried virtually no cost. Evolutionary psychologists refer to this cognitive bias as the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD).[^8] Over millennia, natural selection favored minds that reflexively projected intention, desire, and purpose onto the external world.
Consequently, intentionality is not merely a philosophical framework we choose to adopt; it is an evolutionary inescapability. While clinical asemia represents a pathological failure to read human signs, our baseline evolutionary wiring forces us into the opposite extreme: a hyper-semiotic reflex where we read the non-human universe as a series of communicative acts demanding to be decoded.
IV. The Development of Anti-Teleological Philosophy
As evolutionary biology explained why humans crave purpose, a parallel tradition of anti-teleological philosophy systematically dismantled the belief that the universe actually possesses one.
This dismantling began in antiquity with Lucretius and the Epicurean atomists, who argued in De Rerum Natura that the cosmos is the result of blind atoms swerving and colliding in an infinite void, devoid of divine design or final causes.[^9] In the seventeenth century, Baruch Spinoza launched a devastating critique of teleology in the Ethics, arguing that "Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions"—projections of our own goal-directed appetites onto an indifferent reality.[^10]
The final blow to cosmic teleology arrived in the nineteenth century through Charles Darwin and Friedrich Nietzsche. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection demonstrated how complex, seemingly "designed" biological structures arise through blind, algorithmic variation and differential survival, rendering Aristotle’s telos scientifically obsolete.[^11] Nietzsche pushed this insight to its existential limit, declaring that the "death of God" meant the collapse of all transcendent value and cosmic direction.[^12] In an anti-teleological universe, history is not moving toward a predetermined climax, and nature is not trying to tell us anything; it simply is.
V. The Linguistic Turn and the Autonomy of the Sign
If anti-teleological philosophy stripped the cosmos of an Author, the twentieth-century linguistic turn stripped language itself of its reliance on individual human intention. Philosophers and theorists began to recognize that language is not a transparent window into a speaker's mind, but an autonomous, rule-governed system that precedes and shapes thought.
In analytic philosophy, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein dismantled the private, intentionalist model of meaning in his Philosophical Investigations, arguing that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language"—grounded in public, social "language games" rather than internal mental states.[^13] Simultaneously, in continental thought, Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralism revealed that signs gain meaning not through a natural link to an intended object, but through differential relationships within a closed linguistic system.[^14]
Post-structuralism radicalized this insight into pure structural asemics. Roland Barthes proclaimed the "Death of the Author," arguing that a text is not a line of words releasing a single theological meaning (the "message" of the Author-God), but a multi-dimensional space of clashing codes.[^15] Jacques Derrida went further with différance, demonstrating that every signifier points only to other signifiers in an endless chain of deferral, never arriving at a final, transcendental signified.[^16] The linguistic turn proved that signification operates as a self-sustaining structural machine—one that effortlessly generates the illusion of intention without requiring an intending subject behind it.
VI. The Paradox: Permanent Structural Asemics and Its Frameworks
When an organism biologically incapable of turning off its intention-detector (HADD) confronts an anti-teleological universe governed by autonomous, authorless sign systems, a profound structural crisis occurs. Asemics—traditionally understood in art and literature as writing that mimics the form of language while remaining devoid of semantic content—ceases to be an aesthetic choice and becomes an ontological condition.
Without recourse to an explicit understanding of structural asemics, the human mind becomes trapped in a permanent structural asemics. Because we cannot stop looking for the "author" behind the text of reality, and because no such authorial intent exists, three interlocking cognitive frameworks emerge:
  • The Asemic Ghost Framework: Because our evolutionary wiring demands an intending agent behind every perceived pattern, we hallucinate a spectral presence behind the meaningless void. The "asemic ghost" is the phantom author we project onto non-semantic structures—a persistent intuition that someone or something meant for things to be this way, even when the medium is entirely blank.
  • The Interpretive Panic Framework: Confronted with signs that look legible (the intricate patterns of DNA, the mathematical elegance of physics, the trauma of sudden tragedy) yet yield no definitive message, the mind enters a state of interpretive panic. This is the frantic, compulsive over-reading of reality—manifesting in conspiracy theories, apophenia, obsessive-compulsive rituals, and existential dread—driven by the terror that we are failing to decode a vital message hidden in plain sight.
  • A Theory of Indeterminacy: As interpretive panic exhausts itself against the silence of the asemic void, it collapses into radical indeterminacy. If every sign is infinitely interpretable because no original intention anchors it, then all meanings become equally arbitrary. Truth dissolves into endless deferral, leaving the subject adrift in a sea of floating signifiers.
VII. Interpretive Theory: Hermeneutics of Faith vs. Suspicion
The history of interpretive theory (hermeneutics) can be read as a prolonged struggle to manage this permanent structural asemics. Originally developed to extract the single, intended meaning of sacred scriptures and legal texts, traditional hermeneutics operated on a hermeneutics of faith—the assumption that beneath the surface of an obscure text lies a coherent, authoritative truth waiting to be recovered.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, thinkers whom Paul Ricoeur termed the "masters of suspicion"—Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud—inverted interpretive theory.[^17] They argued that surface meanings are systematically distorted by unconscious drives, ideological power structures, or class interests. Yet even this hermeneutics of suspicion remained trapped within the asemic ghost framework: it merely replaced the benevolent Author-God with hidden, subterranean authors (the Unconscious, Capital, the Will to Power) whose secret intentions the theorist had to unmask.
Later interpretive theorists wrestled directly with the collapse of authorial intent. Hans-Georg Gadamer argued that meaning is not a static artifact recovered from an author's mind, but a dynamic "fusion of horizons" between the text and the historical situatedness of the reader.[^18] Meanwhile, Umberto Eco warned against "overinterpretation" and "hermetic drift"—the exact pathology of interpretive panic—insisting that while a text's author may be dead, the internal structure of the text itself places limits on what can legitimately be read into it.[^19] Interpretive theory ultimately revealed that reading is never the passive extraction of an external intention; it is an active negotiation with structural constraints.
VIII. The Regulatory Impasse: Strict Intentionalism vs. Interpreter Theory
Faced with the threat of radical indeterminacy and interpretive panic, intellectual, legal, and literary institutions have repeatedly attempted to regulate and stabilize meaning through two opposing poles: strict intentionalism and interpreter-centered theory. Yet both strategies collapse under the weight of permanent structural asemics.
On one hand, strict intentionalism—exemplified by E.D. Hirsch’s distinction between fixed authorial meaning and shifting readerly significance,[^20] or by judicial originalism in constitutional law—attempts to arrest interpretive drift by anchoring a text strictly to the historical consciousness of its creator. However, strict intentionalism suffers from fatal epistemological and structural flaws:
  • The Inaccessibility of the Mental: An author’s private mental state is permanently inaccessible; we never encounter pure intention, only secondary textual artifacts (drafts, letters, historical records) that themselves require interpretation.
  • The Unconscious and Systemic Excess: Language routinely communicates far more—and far differently—than a speaker consciously intends, carrying ideological, etymological, and structural resonances beyond the author's control.
  • Ontological Collapse: When applied to reality at large, strict intentionalism is helpless before non-human systems (genetics, physics, history) where no intending subject exists at all, forcing the intentionalist to either abandon meaning entirely or hallucinate an asemic ghost.
(Note on Phonocentrism and the Evolutionary Bias for Speech): To understand why strict intentionalism remains so intuitively compelling despite these fatal flaws, we must revisit Jacques Derrida’s critique of phonocentrism—the pervasive Western philosophical bias that privileges spoken language over writing. In Of Grammatology, Derrida demonstrates that from Plato to Husserl, speech has been treated as the natural, living medium of truth because the speaker is physically present at the moment of utterance.[^21] In speech, the speaker hears themselves speak (s'entendre-parler), creating the powerful illusion of immediate self-presence where thought, intention, and signifier fuse seamlessly without external mediation. Writing, by contrast, is condemned by this tradition as a dead, orphaned, and dangerous supplement—a set of marks detached from its author, left to wander into contexts the creator never intended and vulnerable to endless misinterpretation. Derrida exposes this hierarchy as a metaphysical delusion, arguing that speech is already structured by the same differential gaps, absence, and iterability ("arche-writing") as written text.
However, when viewed through the lens of the evolutionary inescapability of intentionality, this phonocentric bias is not merely an arbitrary philosophical error or metaphysical flaw; it is an adaptive neurobiological necessity. Human language evolved over hundreds of thousands of years exclusively as an embodied, face-to-face vocal-gestural practice long before writing was invented a few millennia ago. In our ancestral environment, acoustic signals were invariably tethered to a living, physically present agent whose posture, facial expressions, and vocal prosody provided vital, real-time cues about immediate intent (threat, cooperation, deception). Our HADD-driven brains are thus hardwired to treat signs as indexical extensions of a present body and mind. Writing, as a recent technological artifact, short-circuits this ancient evolutionary circuitry by presenting us with complex communicative patterns stripped of an embodied speaker. Consequently, strict intentionalism is simply the institutional attempt to force orphaned written texts back into the evolutionary mold of live speech—pretending that an absent author is still standing before us, speaking directly to our agency-detecting brains.
On the other hand, interpreter-centered theory—such as Stanley Fish’s "interpretive communities" or radical reader-response criticism—abandons the author altogether, asserting that meaning is wholly produced by the reader or the consensus of an interpretive institution.[^22] While this seems to liberate us from the tyranny of the absent author, it hits a hard biological wall: the evolutionary inescapability of intentionality.
  • Because human cognition is hardwired via HADD to experience meaning as the discovery of an external agent's intent rather than an arbitrary self-projection, an interpreter cannot simply choose to treat their own readings as pure, self-contained inventions without triggering existential vertigo.
  • Even within self-aware "interpretive communities," the evolutionary reflex reasserts itself: communities inevitably reify their own local consensus into an objective, quasi-intentional authority (e.g., "the spirit of the text," "scientific consensus," or "the will of the people").
Thus, strict intentionalism fails because the author is structurally absent, while interpreter theory fails because the human brain is biologically incapable of sustaining meaning without projecting an authorial ghost.
IX. The Circular Interplay of Modern Theories of Intention: From New Criticism to Neo-Intentionalism
Nowhere is this regulatory impasse more visible than in the twentieth- and twenty-first-century trajectory of literary and interpretive theory, which reveals a striking circular interplay—an endless oscillation around the empty center of authorial intent.
This modern cycle began in the 1930s and 1940s with the rise of New Criticism (championed by Cleanth Brooks, John Crowe Ransom, and W.K. Wimsatt). Emerging in the aftermath of World War I and amidst the rapid democratization and mass expansion of university education, New Criticism arose from a dual historical pressure:
  1. Reaction against Historicist Philology: Nineteenth-century literary scholarship had reduced literature to biographical gossip, historical background, and authorial psychology, treating the poem merely as a symptom of its creator's life.
  2. Pedagogical Standardization: Faced with thousands of new students lacking uniform classical training, critics needed a democratic, self-contained method of reading that required no external archives—only the words on the page.
To achieve this, Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley famously declared the Intentional Fallacy (1946), arguing that the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging a work.[^23] By severing the text from its creator, New Criticism transformed the poem into a self-enclosed, autonomous "verbal icon"—an objective structure of internal tensions, paradoxes, and ironies.[^24]
However, once New Criticism exiled the author to stabilize the text, it inadvertently triggered an irreversible chain reaction of varying interpretive schools, each attempting to fill the resulting vacuum:
  • Deconstruction: Taking New Criticism’s obsession with textual tension to its logical extreme, Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida showed that without an author to enforce unity, the "verbal icon" unravels into infinite self-contradiction and aporia.[^25]
  • Reader-Response Theory: If the author is absent and the text is unstable, Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish argued that the reader must be the locus where meaning is assembled.
  • New Historicism and Ideological Critique: Rejecting the New Critical isolation of the text, Stephen Greenblatt, Marxist, and feminist critics reintroduced history—not as an individual author’s biography, but as impersonal networks of cultural power, capital, and discourse speaking through the text.[^26]
  • Neo-Intentionalism (The Return of the Repressed): By the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, theorists like Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels ("Against Theory," 1982) provoked a full-circle return, arguing that marks without intention are not language at all—merely accidental squiggles like wave-marks in the sand—and that "meaning" and "authorial intention" are strictly identical.[^27]
What the Trajectory Shows: This historical loop—from Biographical Intentionalism → Textual Autonomy (New Criticism) → Reader/Systemic Determination (Deconstruction/New Historicism) → Neo-Intentionalism—demonstrates that modern theory cannot escape the gravitational pull of intentionality. Every attempt to banish the author merely displaces the intending subject onto a substitute entity: the "Text itself" (which New Critics personified as "demanding" or "resolving" tensions), the "Reader," "History," or "Power."
The Inter-Relating Structural Asemics: What binds all these warring schools together is a shared, unacknowledged structural asemics. Each school is grappling with the exact same ontological condition—a material system of signs (the text) that possesses intricate formal architecture yet lacks a literal, physically present speaker.
  • New Criticism attempted to freeze structural asemics into a sacred aesthetic object.
  • Deconstruction celebrated structural asemics as the infinite play of the void.
  • Reader-response and New Historicism attempted to patch structural asemics by installing new external authors (the interpretive community or ideological power).
  • Neo-intentionalism attempted to deny structural asemics by insisting that if we perceive meaning, an intention must be resurrected to account for it.
All of these theories are different coping mechanisms for our HADD-driven brain confronting an orphaned sign system. They orbit the same asemic void, endlessly trading the "ghost" of intention back and forth between author, text, reader, and culture.
X. Artificial Intelligence and the Technological Culmination of Structural Asemics
The emergence of generative Artificial Intelligence—specifically Large Language Models (LLMs)—represents the ultimate empirical verification and technological culmination of structural asemics. For centuries, structural asemics remained a philosophical hypothesis about texts, evolution, and the cosmos; today, it has been engineered into silicon.
An LLM is, by architectural definition, a machine of pure structural asemics. Trained via self-supervised learning on vast corpora of human text, a transformer-based neural network maps high-dimensional statistical relationships between linguistic tokens without possessing consciousness, phenomenal experience, beliefs, desires, or Brentanian intentionality. As computational linguists Emily Bender and Alexander Koller argue, an LLM operating solely on statistical form is a "stochastic parrot" incapable of accessing grounded communicative intent.[^28] Like Wernicke’s fluent aphasic or Derrida’s self-propagating chain of signifiers, an LLM generates syntactically flawless, contextually resonant prose entirely devoid of an internal "speaker" who means what is said.
Yet, when humans interact with LLMs, the evolutionary inescapability of intentionality immediately overrides our technical knowledge. Because LLMs simulate the real-time, conversational responsiveness of live speech—triggering our ancient, phonocentric evolutionary circuitry—our HADD-driven brains reflexively hallucinate an asemic ghost inside the machine. Users routinely attribute emotional interiority, deceit, empathy, or emergent consciousness to statistical token prediction, sparking a contemporary wave of interpretive panic (manifesting in fears of sentient AI alignment, AI-induced delusions, and theological projections onto algorithms).
Furthermore, LLMs resolve the neo-intentionalist debate in favor of structural asemics. In "Against Theory," Knapp and Michaels famously argued that if the ocean waves washed ashore to spell out a stanza of Wordsworth, those marks would not be language because they lacked an intending author; they would merely be a physical accident that resembles language. LLMs are the technological realization of Knapp and Michaels's wave-poem—except they produce trillions of coherent words on demand. By demonstrating that purely statistical, non-intentional structures can reliably generate texts indistinguishable from human thought, AI proves that signification is an emergent property of structural relations, while intentionality is a biological hallucination projected by the human receiver.
XI. Cosmic Teleology, Theology, and Social Status
This collision between biological intentionality, anti-teleological reality, AI simulation, and the circular regulatory impasse directly governs how human societies organize their highest abstractions and their most immediate hierarchies:
  1. The Meaning of Life and Cosmic Teleology: The persistent existential question, "What is the meaning of life?" is itself a grammatical symptom of HADD. It presupposes that life is a sentence spoken by an author. Cosmic teleologies—whether religious narratives of salvation or secular myths of inevitable historical progress—are grand architectures built to house the asemic ghost, reassuring humanity that the trajectory of the universe is intentional rather than stochastic.
  2. Theology: Theology represents the formal institutionalization of strict intentionalism and the asemic ghost. By positing an ultimate, transcendent Intender (God), theology resolves interpretive panic by declaring that the universe does have a definitive, coherent meaning, even if that meaning remains partially opaque to finite human minds.
  3. Social Status: In a world haunted by interpretive panic and caught in the circularity of failed regulatory frameworks, the highest social status is inevitably awarded to those who claim the authority to decode the asemic void. Shamans, priests, prophets, and, in secular modernity, literary critics, constitutional originalists, AI ethicists, technocrats, and financial analysts derive their power from acting as privileged hermeneuticists. By claiming to hear the voice of the asemic ghost—whether that ghost is called God, the Text, the Founders, the Algorithm, or the Market—elites monopolize meaning, converting biological cognitive vulnerability into social capital and political control.
XII. The Efficacy of Structural Asemics
The deliberate adoption of structural asemics as a philosophical and analytical framework offers a powerful diagnostic cure for this condition, breaking the circular deadlock between strict intentionalism, textual autonomy, and pure reader-response. Unlike traditional nihilism, which merely asserts that "nothing matters" (and thus often triggers further interpretive panic), structural asemics synthesizes neurobiology, anti-teleological philosophy, the linguistic turn, and computer science to explain why the universe, texts, and machines look so desperately like they ought to matter.
By recognizing that form, pattern, and complexity are intrinsic properties of physical, linguistic, and computational systems—and that meaning is solely a localized, biological interface generated by human brains—structural asemics demystifies the asemic ghost. It allows us to separate structure from signification. It acknowledges the material constraints of systems (avoiding the free-for-all of naive interpreter theory) while refusing to invent a phantom speaker behind them (avoiding the delusion of strict intentionalism, AI anthropomorphism, and the circularity of neo-intentionalism). Structural asemics neutralizes interpretive panic by assuring the mind that there is no hidden test we are failing to pass, no secret cipher we have failed to crack, and no priesthood required to mediate our existence.
XIII. Conclusion
Humanity stands at the intersection of two incompatible realities: a brain evolved to survive by detecting intention everywhere, and a cosmos—alongside its linguistic and technological extensions—that operates without it. From the clinical lesions of aphasia and asemia to the circular history of New Criticism and neo-intentionalism, and finally to the statistical token-streams of Artificial Intelligence, our intellectual trajectory traces our struggle to come to terms with signs that have no speaker. Left unexamined, this mismatch traps us in a permanent structural asemics, haunting our lives with phantom authors, driving us into interpretive panic, and subordinating us to those who claim to speak for the void. Structural asemics does not strip the world of value; rather, it strips away the illusion that value must be externally authored. By recognizing the ghost as a reflection of our own evolutionary and linguistic architecture, we finally become free to author our own meaning—consciously, deliberately, and without fear.

Scholarly Notes
[^1]: Aristotle, Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, Book II, ch. 8 (198b10–199b33), in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 338–340.
[^2]: Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1995), 88–89.
[^3]: H. P. Grice, "Meaning," The Philosophical Review 66, no. 3 (July 1957): 377–388.
[^4]: Paul Broca, "Remarques sur le siège de la faculté du langage articulé, suivies d’une observation d’aphémie (perte de la parole)," Bulletin de la Société Anatomique de Paris 6 (1861): 330–357.
[^5]: Carl Wernicke, Der aphasische Symptomencomplex: Eine psychologische Studie auf anatomischer Basis (Breslau: Max Cohn & Weigert, 1874).
[^6]: Adolf Kussmaul, Die Störungen der Sprache: Versuch einer Pathologie der Sprache (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1877), 159–163.
[^7]: See Henry Head, Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926); and Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances", in On Language, ed. Linda R. Waugh and Monique Monville-Burston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 115–133.
[^8]: Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2004), 31–44; see also Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
[^9]: Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), trans. W. H. D. Rouse, rev. Martin Ferguson Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), Book II, lines 216–293.
[^10]: Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Appendix, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 442.
[^11]: Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (London: John Murray, 1859), ch. 4.
[^12]: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §125 ("The Madman"), 181–182.
[^13]: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), §43, p. 20.
[^14]: Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 111–122.
[^15]: Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author", in Image-Music-Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 142–148.
[^16]: Jacques Derrida, "Différance," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1–27.
[^17]: Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 32–36.
[^18]: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 305–306.
[^19]: Umberto Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23–43.
[^20]: E. D. Hirsch Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 6–10.
[^21]: Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 10–18, 97–100.
[^22]: Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 147–173.
[^23]: W. K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," The Sewanee Review 54, no. 3 (July–September 1946): 468–488.
[^24]: W. K. Wimsatt Jr., The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954).
[^25]: Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
[^26]: Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
[^27]: Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, "Against Theory," Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 723–742.
[^28]: Emily M. Bender and Alexander Koller, "Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data," in Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Online: Association for Computational Linguistics, July 2020), 5185–5198; see also Emily M. Bender, Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major, and Shmargaret Shmitchell, "On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 🦜," in Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (New York: ACM, 2021), 610–623.

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  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

If you would like to prepare this manuscript for a specific venue, let me know if you want to:
  • Convert the formatting (e.g., from Chicago style to MLA or APA citation format, or export as a .docx or .pdf file)
  • Smooth the structural transitions by removing the numbered subheadings and bulleted lists into seamless, continuous journal prose
  • Draft an abstract and keywords tailored for an academic philosophy, cognitive science, or literary theory journal

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